council and one of the city's leading nobles.12 These are but five of several dozen documented outbreaks of violence between 1331 and 1356.
The hatred was deeply compromising. Everyone knew about it, from the nobles down to the shopkeepers, who hastily barred their doors when violence threatened on their doorsteps. Men powerful enough not to fear retaliation openly condemned it.3 Yet links of marriage and blood tied the families to most of the city's leading figures, including many members of the city council. One judge participated openly in warfare and then acted as a lawyer for his friends when the case came to court.14 A rector of the hospital of St. Esprit, the leading charitable institution of the city, was implicated in the violence.15 In 1361, Amiel Bonafos, a conspirator in the murder of Peire de Jerusalem in 1356, was so thoroughly rehabilitated that he was named one of the three city syndics.'6 Even the administrators of the Angevin state were drawn into the vortex-and not only as victims, like the unfortunate lord of Capriers in 1331. The subvicar of 1355, Peire Guibert, murdered a member of the Jerusalem party and nearly lost his life in the retaliation that followed. Common opinion held that the vicarius or vicar, Marseille's chief administrator, openly favored the Jerusalem party.17 So compromising was the hatred between the Vivaut and the Jerusalem that it was never mentioned in the registers of deliberations of the city council. As a result, it cannot be found in the pages of the histories of fourteenth-century Marseille.18
At a first glance, it appears as though a Marxist model could make some sense of the conflict. In the fourteenth century, the Vivaut were rural seigneurs, lords of two villages located some miles east of Marseille, owners of important land rents in and around the city itself. The wealth of the Jerusalem, although equally based in land rents in the fourteenth century, grew out of the family's trade in armaments in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Yet, on tracking down the alliances that formed the larger factions, we find that they cut arbitrarily across status lines. The Martin lineage, whose fortunes were closely entwined with those of the noble Vivaut, were relative newcomers to power and prestige. The family's fortune lay in commerce; their rise to prominence began with their ancestor, the merchant Jacme Martin, who died a wealthy man in 1302. By the same token, the nobleman Isnart Eguesier was a major ally of the entrepreneurial Jerusalem. The clienteles of each party, similarly, were nearly identical in their socioprofessional backgrounds. This being so, it takes a great deal of ingenuity to force the hatred into a Marxist model. For similar reasons, Marseille's domestic politics cannot be understood according to Italian political structures, namely the intense rivalry between Guelf and Ghibelline, the parties of the papacy and the empire. The hatreds that so thoroughly curdled the society of mid-fourteenth-century Marseille were prior to any structure we might devise to explain them. The cleavages and ruptures were contingent and emotional, not structural, in origin.
In an eight-year period following the Black Death of 1348, as the violence deepened and intensified, outbreaks of the feud became the object of several judicial inquisitions. As described in the first section below, these inquisitions were directed by the Angevin-run court of inquisition (curia inquisitionis). An indeterminate 19 number of these inquisitions resulted in condemnations that were subsequently appealed to the court of first appeals. Several appellate registers from the 1350s have survived the passage of time, and in these registers we find twelve appeals concerning the feud. At a first glance, it appears as though a Marxist model could make some sense of the conflict. In the fourteenth century, the Vivaut were rural seigneurs, lords of two villages located some miles east of Marseille, owners of important land rents in and around the city itself. The wealth of the Jerusalem, although equally based in land rents in the fourteenth century, grew out of the family's trade in armaments in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Yet, on tracking down the alliances that formed the larger factions, we find that they cut arbitrarily across status lines. The Martin lineage, whose fortunes were closely entwined with those of the noble Vivaut, were relative newcomers to power and prestige. The family's fortune lay in commerce; their rise to prominence began with their ancestor, the merchant Jacme Martin, who died a wealthy man in 1302. By the same token, the nobleman Isnart Eguesier was a major ally of the entrepreneurial Jerusalem. The clienteles of each party, similarly, were nearly identical in their socioprofessional backgrounds. This being so, it takes a great deal of ingenuity to force the hatred into a Marxist model. For similar reasons, Marseille's domestic politics cannot be understood according to Italian political structures, namely the intense rivalry between Guelf and Ghibelline, the parties of the papacy and the empire. The hatreds that so thoroughly curdled the society of mid-fourteenth-century Marseille were prior to any structure we might devise to explain them. The cleavages and ruptures were contingent and emotional, not structural, in origin.
In an eight-year period following the Black Death of 1348, as the violence deepened and intensified, outbreaks of the feud became the object of several judicial inquisitions. As described in the first section below, these inquisitions were directed by the Angevin-run court of inquisition (curia inquisitionis). An indeterminate 19 number of these inquisitions resulted in condemnations that were subsequently appealed to the court of first appeals. Several appellate registers from the 1350s have survived the passage of time, and in these registers we find twelve appeals concerning the feud. the appellate witnesses in the four cases. As one reads the cases, one moves naturally from the trial to the appeal, thereby recapitulating the original sequence of events. To read in this way is to witness a remarkable transformation in the way tales of conflict are told: first by the prosecutor, who tells no story at all, and then by the defendants, who tell dark tales of hatred, of the inevitability of vengeance. As the second section of this article will argue, the tales reveal that vengeance in mid-fourteenth-century Marseille was or had become a language of resistance to Angevin judicial presence. It was a language whose power was implicitly recognized by judges in their attempts to destroy its syntax. It was a language, moreover, that shaped the exercise of justice more than a complacent view of legal evolution would care to admit. The third section will suggest that the courtroom was becoming or had become a venue for the pursuit of vengeance. That is not all. To judge by the cases, the very exercise of justice and power in mid-fourteenth-century Marseille was instrumental in giving shape and structure to the hatred. By allowing defendants a place for the telling of a history, the fourth section will argue, Angevin justice helped groups of unrelated men form a historical identity. By prosecuting the groups, the court helped solidify that identity in a common grievance and a common defense. Angevin justice in Marseille, then, did as much to institutionalize as it did to repress the hatreds that curdled city society, rigidifying relationships of enmity rather than dissolving them. That is not what the developing judicial systems of medieval Europe were supposed to be doing.
Judicial Inquisition
To understand the judicial appeals that form the bulk of the evidence for this article, one must understand the secular court of inquisition out of which most appeals emerged.20 Secular courts using Roman inquisitorial procedures emerged throughout southern Europe in the thirteenth century, following the sudden demise of the ordeal as a mode of proof.21 These procedures were similar to but not identical with those developed at the same time by the infamous papal inquisition; among other things, secular courts did not develop a case load based so heavily on serial and secretive accusations, nor were the accused, most of whom hired expensive lawyers to plead their cause, so 20 Two appeals, discussed below, were initiated by a cousin of the victim. In all other respects, however, they were nearly indistinguishable from trials initiated by the court itself. 21 On the relationship between ordeal and inquisition see Robert Bartlett, Trial by Fire and Water: The MedievalJudicial Ordeal (Oxford, 1988) . the appellate witnesses in the four cases. As one reads the cases, one moves naturally from the trial to the appeal, thereby recapitulating the original sequence of events.
To read in this way is to witness a remarkable transformation in the way tales of conflict are told: first by the prosecutor, who tells no story at all, and then by the defendants, who tell dark tales of hatred, of the inevitability of vengeance. As the second section of this article will argue, the tales reveal that vengeance in mid-fourteenth-century Marseille was or had become a language of resistance to Angevin judicial presence. It was a language whose power was implicitly recognized by judges in their attempts to destroy its syntax. It was a language, moreover, that shaped the exercise of justice more than a complacent view of legal evolution would care to admit. The third section will suggest that the courtroom was becoming or had become a venue for the pursuit of vengeance. That is not all. To judge by the cases, the very exercise of justice and power in mid-fourteenth-century Marseille was instrumental in giving shape and structure to the hatred. By allowing defendants a place for the telling of a history, the fourth section will argue, Angevin justice helped groups of unrelated men form a historical identity. By prosecuting the groups, the court helped solidify that identity in a common grievance and a common defense. Angevin justice in Marseille, then, did as much to institutionalize as it did to repress the hatreds that curdled city society, rigidifying relationships of enmity rather than dissolving them. That is not what the developing judicial systems of medieval Europe were supposed to be doing.
To understand the judicial appeals that form the bulk of the evidence for this article, one must understand the secular court of inquisition out of which most appeals emerged.20 Secular courts using Roman inquisitorial procedures emerged throughout southern Europe in the thirteenth century, following the sudden demise of the ordeal as a mode of proof.21 These procedures were similar to but not identical with those developed at the same time by the infamous papal inquisition; among other things, secular courts did not develop a case load based so heavily on serial and secretive accusations, nor were the accused, most of whom hired expensive lawyers to plead their cause, so 20 Two appeals, discussed below, were initiated by a cousin of the victim. In all other respects, however, they were nearly indistinguishable from trials initiated by the court itself. defenseless. To understand Marseille's court of inquisition, however, one must first retreat a step further and address the alternative to justice: peacemaking.22 In Angevin Marseille, as elsewhere, acts of violence typically generated a ritual response, the desire for vengeance. The bloodfeud or the vendetta, where practiced, is corrosive, and often costly as well, both for avengers and for the objects of their vengeance. But vengeance can be diverted by the act of peacemaking, the very threat of vengeance used as a tool to get the aggressor to perform the necessary acts of expiation. In many regions of medieval Europe, especially from the central Middle Ages onward, the hatreds spawned by violence could be assuaged through acts of peacemaking, often directed by the church, often operating outside the confines of the newly emerging legal procedures of incipient states.23 The culture of peace had become so powerful by the fourteenth century that in France as in most regions of Europe, the feud, as a more or less interminable series of exchanges, was extremely limited in scope.24 Still, it was the continuing threat of the feud, at least in theory, that drove peacemaking. Peacemaking in Marseille and elsewhere in southern France and Europe required the exile (voluntary or involuntary) of the aggressor; the intervention of peacemakers, either members of the mendicant orders or highly respected noblemen; the payment of some compensation; and, perhaps most important, a public spectacle of contrition and forgiveness, usually involving the exchange of the kiss of peace. In the lands of the Roman law, the result of those processes was conveniently distilled in the notarial peace accord. This was a formal legal contract entered into by both parties, drawn up by a public notary, using standard notarial protocols, and witnessed by an array of significant people. Eight such peace accords have survived from Marseille across a period of twenty-five years in the mid-fourteenth century. The haphazard survival of notarial casebooks indicates that the act itself was much more common. defenseless. To understand Marseille's court of inquisition, however, one must first retreat a step further and address the alternative to justice: peacemaking.22 In Angevin Marseille, as elsewhere, acts of violence typically generated a ritual response, the desire for vengeance. The bloodfeud or the vendetta, where practiced, is corrosive, and often costly as well, both for avengers and for the objects of their vengeance. But vengeance can be diverted by the act of peacemaking, the very threat of vengeance used as a tool to get the aggressor to perform the necessary acts of expiation. In many regions of medieval Europe, especially from the central Middle Ages onward, the hatreds spawned by violence could be assuaged through acts of peacemaking, often directed by the church, often operating outside the confines of the newly emerging legal procedures of incipient states.23 The culture of peace had become so powerful by the fourteenth century that in France as in most regions of Europe, the feud, as a more or less interminable series of exchanges, was extremely limited in scope.24 Still, it was the continuing threat of the feud, at least in theory, that drove peacemaking. Peacemaking in Marseille and elsewhere in southern France and Europe required the exile (voluntary or involuntary) of the aggressor; the intervention of peacemakers, either members of the mendicant orders or highly respected noblemen; the payment of some compensation; and, perhaps most important, a public spectacle of contrition and forgiveness, usually involving the exchange of the kiss of peace. In the lands of the Roman law, the result of those processes was conveniently distilled in the notarial peace accord. This was a formal legal contract entered into by both parties, drawn up by a public notary, using standard notarial protocols, and witnessed by an array of significant people. Eight such peace accords have survived from Marseille across a period of twenty-five years in the mid-fourteenth century. The haphazard survival of notarial casebooks indicates that the act itself was much more common. Given the development of increasingly sophisticated peacemaking mechanisms, judicial inquisition, even in the mid-fourteenth century, was only one of two channels through which acts of violence could be handled.25 In Angevin Marseille, inquisition was not even the most prominent channel for handling crime, at least in cases of homicide.26 The more serious the act of violence, the more likely it was that the criminal would be summarily expelled from the city-if he had not already exiled himself or sought sanctuary in a church, as many were wont to do. Marseille's statute on homicide, in fact, declared that a murderer had to make peace with four or five of the victim's kin before being allowed to return to the city; in this way, formal authority over the case was automatically transferred to the peacemaking procedure.27 The standard notarial peace accord included a clause preventing the victim or his or her kin from pursuing any judicial redress for the act of violence, thereby making concrete the genuine distinction between the two systems.
This clause did not, of course, prevent the inquisition from initiating its own accusations in cases of violence, nor, by definition, could it restrain the unpacified victims of violence from initiating their own suits. Nonetheless, the few surviving judicial inquisitions and trials involving cases of homicide or severe wounds typically centered on incidental offenses, such as forming illicit groups, bearing arms, and sometimes traveling by night without a lantern.28 The trial of the murderers of Peire deJerusalem in 1356, which technically was not an inquisition because the prosecution was initiated and directed by a cousin of the dead man, illustrates well this general pattern. We can assess the principal charges because the prosecutor had the relevant city statutes and public proclamations (preconizationes) pertaining to each of the charges copied out in full in the transcript. These statutes were limited to several statuti rassarum, a series of laws forbidding secret conspiracies: the most prominent was the statute "That Secret 28 The situation was in fact slightly more complicated than this, because the inquisition seems to have limited the scope of its prosecution to charges such as these even in cases where no peace accord was forthcoming.
Given the development of increasingly sophisticated peacemaking mechanisms, judicial inquisition, even in the mid-fourteenth century, was only one of two channels through which acts of violence could be handled.25 In Angevin Marseille, inquisition was not even the most prominent channel for handling crime, at least in cases of homicide.26 The more serious the act of violence, the more likely it was that the criminal would be summarily expelled from the city-if he had not already exiled himself or sought sanctuary in a church, as many were wont to do. Marseille's statute on homicide, in fact, declared that a murderer had to make peace with four or five of the victim's kin before being allowed to return to the city; in this way, formal authority over the case was automatically transferred to the peacemaking procedure.27 The standard notarial peace accord included a clause preventing the victim or his or her kin from pursuing any judicial redress for the act of violence, thereby making concrete the genuine distinction between the two systems.
This clause did not, of course, prevent the inquisition from initiating its own accusations in cases of violence, nor, by definition, could it restrain the unpacified victims of violence from initiating their own suits. Nonetheless, the few surviving judicial inquisitions and trials involving cases of homicide or severe wounds typically centered on incidental offenses, such as forming illicit groups, bearing arms, and sometimes traveling by night without a lantern.28 The trial of the murderers of Peire deJerusalem in 1356, which technically was not an inquisition because the prosecution was initiated and directed by a cousin of the dead man, illustrates well this general pattern. We can assess the principal charges because the prosecutor had the relevant city statutes and public proclamations (preconizationes) pertaining to each of the charges copied out in full in the transcript. These statutes were limited to several statuti rassarum, a series of laws forbidding secret conspiracies: the most prominent was the statute "That Secret faciendis].29 Following that is a transcript of a "public proclamation that forbade the bearing of arms" [tenor preconizationis de armis non portandis].30 Although the actual murder was described in some of its gory details, the accusation of murder was itself oddly peripheral to the prosecution. The trial centered instead on seemingly trivial statutory infractions-crimes against the state rather than violence done to a private citizen.
The infractions, of course, were serious enough. Marseille's prosecutors were able to add another charge: peacebreaking. The notarial peace accord included a clause stipulating that those guilty of offending a peace should pay a fine of one hundred pounds or more. Any transgressions, therefore, could be prosecuted as a breach of contract. In the trial described above, arising from the murder of Peire de Jerusalem, not one but two peace accords, the first dated 24 March 1350, the second 26 July 1351, were transcribed to deepen the guilt of the murderers, members of the Vivaut party.31
What this indicates is that the court was reluctant to become involved in relationships of enmity that sprang out of a murder. The court preferred to concentrate on statutory infractions, leaving the hatred itself to the system of peacemaking. The two systems of handling violence, peacemaking and inquisition, did not operate in wholly distinct spheres, since to some extent inquisition built upon the results of peacemaking. The relationship, however, was not entirely symbiotic: inquisition could also destroy the emotional basis of peace. Condemnation, as anthropologists of law have been arguing, is the antithesis of peacemaking, and prosecution, with its all-or-nothing outcome, cannot fail to create anger.32 Seen in this light, inquisition may have interfered, at least in the short term, with the beneficent possibilities of peacemaking.
The existence of a parallel system of peacemaking, then, shaped the exercise of justice in Angevin Marseille. The exercise of justice was also influenced by its own procedures. faciendis].29 Following that is a transcript of a "public proclamation that forbade the bearing of arms" [tenor preconizationis de armis non portandis].30 Although the actual murder was described in some of its gory details, the accusation of murder was itself oddly peripheral to the prosecution. The trial centered instead on seemingly trivial statutory infractions-crimes against the state rather than violence done to a private citizen.
The existence of a parallel system of peacemaking, then, shaped the exercise of justice in Angevin Marseille. The exercise of justice was also influenced by its own procedures. 
An inquisition in fourteenth-century
Marseille proceeded, it seems, only if the malefactors were caught in flagrante delicto. The police force necessary to capture criminals was supervised by an Angevin official known as the subvicar. Like all major Angevin officials and judges, that officer was a foreigner to the city; like his superior the vicar, the subvicar was usually a nobleman of Provence. In various records, we see that official, accompanied by a private force of armed men, arresting and sometimes abusing the citizens of Marseille. If the crime were serious enough, he would take them off to the prison, located near or underneath the royal curia on a street south of the plaza of Accoules. Some defendants were allowed to await trial in their own homes-with the understanding that all their possessions in Marseille would be forfeit should they fail to respond to the eventual summons. Immediately after the event or at most within a month, the case was brought before a judge. This man, the palace judge, presided over the highest court of first instance for both civil and criminal affairs. As inquisition judge (iudex inquisitionis), he was assisted by two lesser judges; accompanied by several notaries, those men formed the court of inquisition (curia inquisitionis). In the street outside the royal palace, or possibly within the building itself, they took testimony from witnesses and formally interrogated each of the defendants in turn. Some of the defendants were tortured in the basement of the palace before interrogation.33 Evidence permitting, the judge then condemned the defendants according to his own assessment of their crimes, and the decision was subsequently announced, formally and publicly, in the name of the vicar at public parlements, held five or six times a year in the nearby plaza of Accoules. Defendants were never allowed to present a formal defense, other than the limited denial they could offer during testimony.
All cases could be appealed, however, and it was during the appeal that defendants were finally able to tell their side of the story. An appeal usually began with arguments over the permissibility of the appeal; following that came a transcript of the inquisition trial. Following court rules that were identical to civil procedures, defendants then offered a list of titles or tituli (tenor titulorum) to prove their innocence and a list of witnesses to testify to the titles.34 The largest section 33 In the pages of one appeal arising from an inquisition that began in November 1351, we can see all three judges-the palace judge, Johan Symeon, accompanied by the two lesser judges, Guilhem de Montoliu and Johan de Quinciato-supervising the torture of an immigrant suspected of homicide (see ADBR, IIIB 811, fols. 3v, 7). Marseille's inquisition used the torture horse (eculeum) and seems to have employed it most commonly with lower status defendants.
34 A very few appellate transcripts at this point include a list of questions that the judges intended to pose to the witnesses.
All cases could be appealed, however, and it was during the appeal that defendants were finally able to tell their side of the story. An appeal usually began with arguments over the permissibility of the appeal; following that came a transcript of the inquisition trial. Following court rules that were identical to civil procedures, defendants then offered a list of titles or tituli (tenor titulorum) to prove their innocence and a list of witnesses to testify to the titles.34 The largest section of the appeal was reserved for the witness depositions, as each witness was asked to respond in turn to each of the titles, saying all that he or she knew that was pertinent.
Unlike the inquisition, however, the audience in the appeal was not necessarily restricted to the judge of the appellate court. We should, in fact, be wary of ever assuming that judges or juries are the sole audiences for any defense: defendants, even those who lose, can always benefit from a sympathetic public hearing. In Angevin Marseille, this appeal to a wider audience was promoted by the space in which the appeal was heard: like the courts for civil suits, the appeals court convened its sessions outdoors, in booths located in the plaza of Accoules, just beneath the lower door of the great parish church of Notre Dame des Accoules. Ringed by the church, the Hospital of St. Esprit, where the city council sat in session, and the royal curia, near one of the city's major markets, the plaza of Accoules was the heart of the city. It was a place where religion, authority, commerce, and justice intermingled, where all manner of citizens could be found. To understand the nature of the stories told during the appeal, it is important to understand that the stories may have had that larger public audience, that those who of the appeal was reserved for the witness depositions, as each witness was asked to respond in turn to each of the titles, saying all that he or she knew that was pertinent.
Unlike the inquisition, however, the audience in the appeal was not necessarily restricted to the judge of the appellate court. We should, in fact, be wary of ever assuming that judges or juries are the sole audiences for any defense: defendants, even those who lose, can always benefit from a sympathetic public hearing. In Angevin Marseille, this appeal to a wider audience was promoted by the space in which the appeal was heard: like the courts for civil suits, the appeals court convened its sessions outdoors, in booths located in the plaza of Accoules, just beneath the lower door of the great parish church of Notre Dame des Accoules. Ringed by the church, the Hospital of St. Esprit, where the city council sat in session, and the royal curia, near one of the city's major markets, the plaza of Accoules was the heart of the city. It was a place where religion, authority, commerce, and justice intermingled, where all manner of citizens could be found. To understand the nature of the stories told during the appeal, it is important to understand that the stories may have had that larger public audience, that those who recruited the storytellers may have been concerned as much to impress the court of public opinion as they were to impress the judge.
Telling Histories
As dusk fell on the evening of 22 July 1351, the feast of St. Mary Magdalene, a group of men gathered in the plaza of the Vivaut to discuss the terms of a peace accord. Relations between the factions had been tense for the past week or two, to the point that several Vivaut allies and clients had prudently abandoned their homes located in the street of the Jerusalem, moving toward the comparative safety of the plaza of the Vivaut.35 Sporadic clashes between the rivals had punctuated the day: a Vivaut client, walking through the Cobblers' Quarter, had been attacked suddenly by a sword-wielding minion of the Jerusalem party; another Vivaut ally lay wounded in a nearby house. Full of wrath, anticipating violence, armed Vivaut allies and clients from all over the city gathered in the plaza and milled about, talking among themselves and watching the peace discussions unfold. Some were sleeping in the houses that ringed the plaza, their arms near at hand.
Suddenly a woman cried out, "Behold the enemies!"36 for word had come that a host of armed men, between forty and one hundred fifty men in number, was marching toward the plaza of the Vivaut, headed by Peire deJerusalem and anotherJerusalem party captain, Isnart Eguesier. Hastily grabbing arms, Vivaut adherents poured out of the houses surrounding the plaza and hurried off eastward, down the street of the Vivaut, to confront the enemy. A scuffle ensued two blocks east of the plaza, at the foot of the street of the Massa: swords were drawn and blows delivered. The leaders, according to their own testimony, asked those fighting to retire peaceably, whereupon members of the Vivaut party returned to their houses. On the narrow streets of the city some of these men never even saw the enemy.
The violence was curiously restrained, the result less than bloody, but the potential for greater warfare seemed to horrify city leaders. Over the next few days, practically every figure of importance in the city administrationjoined with the parties to hammer out the peace accord; a formal instrument of peace, following a standard notarial protocol, was drawn up on 26July 1351. Yet in September, the court of inquisition recruited the storytellers may have been concerned as much to impress the court of public opinion as they were to impress the judge.
The violence was curiously restrained, the result less than bloody, but the potential for greater warfare seemed to horrify city leaders. Over the next few days, practically every figure of importance in the city administrationjoined with the parties to hammer out the peace accord; a formal instrument of peace, following a standard notarial protocol, was drawn up on 26July 1351. Yet in September, the court of inquisition decided to prosecute the parties for a series of lesser charges, primarily bearing arms within the city walls and making illicit congregations. By the late autumn, a sentence had been passed down: the leaders of the Vivaut and Martin party, twenty-four in all, were each fined between one hundred and two hundred pounds for their involvement in the fighting. The fines were collectively appealed a few months later.37
Filling eighty-five folios of one court register, the appeal they lodged is one of the longest cases extant from mid-fourteenth-century On the same day [28 September 1351], Johan Aycart, one of the condemned men against whom the inquisition is being made, swore to abide by the order of the court and to tell the truth regarding the first accusation of the inquisition. It was diligently read and explained to him in the vulgar. As a principal concerning his own deeds and as a witness to those of others, he wholly denied the truth of every accusation made against him and, as a witness, said that he knew nothing. Asked if he had ever joined an illicit gathering either within the city of Marseille or outside, he said no. Asked if he knew or had heard it said that the party ofJohan Vivaut had congregated without license from the court, he said no.
On the second accusation . . ., he said he knew nothing. On the third accusation ... he said it was true that the quarrel [insultus] took place on the day described in the accusation. He also said that several days earlier he, the witness, had moved from the street of the Jerusalem, in which his own house was located, to a house belonging toJacme Sialhe, a house given to him byJacme out of fear of the Jerusalem party. On the day of the quarrel, the speaker heard the cry, "To arms! to arms! behold the enemies!" namely those of the Jerusalem faction On the fourth accusation .. ., he said he knew nothing.
Several features of the testimony stand out. First, the action was restricted to the space of several minutes. The only exception was the claim that the witness had left the street of the Jerusalem and moved to the plaza of the Vivaut several days before the battle. The bulk of the recorded testimony, made in response to the third accusation, was limited to the space of a few minutes, from the initial cry and the surge outward from the plaza of the Vivaut to the retreat of the Vivaut party members to their homes.
The testimony-or at least the part of it that was recorded-was therefore dominated not by the story of the events, but by the lists of weapons, names, and (to a lesser extent) the blows that fill the response to the third accusation. The list of proscribed weapons provided the judge with an easy way to fine the troublemakers; by keeping careful track of defensive and offensive arms, moreover, the judge could more readily assess the pleas of self-defense and peacefulness that this defendant, like others, managed to work into his testimony. The list of names was doubly useful: not only could the judge keep track of the participants, but he could also check the list against the list of the people who had committed themselves to the peace accord of 24 March 1350, thereby knowing whom he should fine more severely.
That way of asking questions had the effect of slicing the events up into discrete and disjointed frames. As one reads through the sub-42 The word miles was written in superscript after the name and was probably added as an afterthought by the notary so that this Guilhem should not be confused with the jurist Guilhem de Montoliu, who at that very moment was serving as one of the lesser inquisition judges. 43 Cecidit would normally mean "murdered." Why the notary used this word (there is no other evidence suggesting that anyone died in this battle) is a mystery, as is the active voice, when to this point the witness has consistently presented himself as being passive. On the fourth accusation .. ., he said he knew nothing.
That way of asking questions had the effect of slicing the events up into discrete and disjointed frames. As one reads through the sub-42 The word miles was written in superscript after the name and was probably added as an afterthought by the notary so that this Guilhem should not be confused with the jurist Guilhem de Montoliu, who at that very moment was serving as one of the lesser inquisition judges. 43 Cecidit would normally mean "murdered." Why the notary used this word (there is no other evidence suggesting that anyone died in this battle) is a mystery, as is the active voice, when to this point the witness has consistently presented himself as being passive. sequent depositions, one is inundated by a mass of disjointed and repetitive information. It is very hard to pull a story out of the lists. That may have been a deliberate tactic by the judge of the inquisition, for it served two convenient ends. First, it enabled the judge to focus testimony on infractions that were easily proven, such as bearing arms. Second, it distracted attention away from the long-term grievances that led up to the conflict. By so doing, the rhetoric of prosecution managed to avoid any reference to the larger and nastier political context.
In their original depositions, the Vivaut defendants, clearly constrained by the rhetorical framework used by the judge, were unable to fashion a convincing storyline. In response to the disjointed questioning, they could only portray themselves as men of peace. Asked why he became involved in the battle, the defendant Amiel Bonafos claimed that when he heard a warning cry he seized his weapons, rushed out to the plaza in front of his house, and asked his allies to return home--as they did, although the scribe added a skeptical ut dicit after this passage.44 Johan Aycart, as we have seen, admitted that he tried to strike someone but failed, suffering multiple blows in return; asked why he had gone to the battle, he echoed Amiel in saying that he intended to call back the members of the Vivaut party.45 When a third defendant was asked whether the members of the faction began fighting immediately after rushing out onto the plaza, he answered, "No, becauseJohan Vivaut [the eponymous leader of the faction] did not wish the plaza of the Vivaut to be torn up." 46
The tale changes when we turn from the witness depositions in the inquisition trial to testimony heard in the appeal, which opened in December 1351. The appeal was directed by the jurist Primar Mirapeis, a friend and ally of the Vivaut party. The defense he constructed by no means abandoned the claim of self-defense. With the twenty-fifth and the twenty-eighth of the thirty-one titles, Primar claimed that the Jerusalem had invaded the territory assigned to the Vivaut by a previous judge;47 the twenty-seventh title argued that the men who gathered in the plaza of the Vivaut bore only defensive arms. 48 See, for example, the testimony of one of the defendants, Montoliu de Montoliu, who claimed (ibid., fol. 68r) that the arms borne by the Vivaut (breastplates and corselets) were used sequent depositions, one is inundated by a mass of disjointed and repetitive information. It is very hard to pull a story out of the lists. That may have been a deliberate tactic by the judge of the inquisition, for it served two convenient ends. First, it enabled the judge to focus testimony on infractions that were easily proven, such as bearing arms. Second, it distracted attention away from the long-term grievances that led up to the conflict. By so doing, the rhetoric of prosecution managed to avoid any reference to the larger and nastier political context.
In their original depositions, the Vivaut defendants, clearly constrained by the rhetorical framework used by the judge, were unable to fashion a convincing storyline. In response to the disjointed questioning, they could only portray themselves as men of peace. Asked why he became involved in the battle, the defendant Amiel Bonafos claimed that when he heard a warning cry he seized his weapons, rushed out to the plaza in front of his house, and asked his allies to return home--as they did, although the scribe added a skeptical ut dicit after this pas- shrink from a defense based on procedures: the judge of the inquisition, for example, was formally incompetent to serve, having been elected to office by a committee that included an excommunicate (the city councilor Peire Desdier). Titles one through sixteen and eleven of the seventeen witnesses were devoted to such procedural issues, and testimony on those takes up the bulk of the depositions.
But although the appeal lodged by the Martin brothers was temporarily quashed on a technicality.61
In the appeal of Amiel Bonafos, similar in size and structure to the one that followed the battle of 1351, the history of the feud was presented with even more historical depth and rigor, as twenty-five witnesses were brought to attest to seventeen titles, six of which were devoted toJerusalem iniquities.62 New stories emerge in those appeals:
given the interval of time, the list of Jerusalem iniquities had grown. From those two appeals, along with that of Girart de Buco, we can reconstruct the history outlined below.
Sources: ADBR, IIIB 811, 812, 819, 820. although the appeal lodged by the Martin brothers was temporarily quashed on a technicality.61
given the interval of time, the list of Jerusalem iniquities had grown. From those two appeals, along with that of Girart de Buco, we can reconstruct the history outlined below. personal fortune I have been able to uncover is that of Alexander Girart, who claimed in a court case that he was worth three thousand pounds; see ADBR, IIIB 812, case ofJacoba Augeleria, fol. It was also Boneta who related the next incident, the wounding of the subvicar, the lord of Capriers, around the year 1331. She was then living in the house of a relative, Bertrana Sarda, underneath the royal palace. She heard a quarrel in the street and saw the lord of Capriers wounded in the forehead; brought into a nearby house where she was present, he told those present that Uguo and Peire deJerusalem had done it.64
Her stories, corroborated in part by an old man, Peire Bausan, who had preceded her, helped establish that the grievances were not restricted to the Vivaut and perhaps their immediate allies. About a third of the witnesses recruited by Amiel, in fact, were not obviously members of the Vivaut party. As in the earlier appeal, the seeming impartiality of the witnesses contributed to the verisimilitude of the tales they told, illustrating the public nature of the facts. The point being made was obvious: These were not private stories shared around the hearth in miserly fashion. They were public histories, known to all Massiliotes. "Ten, twenty, thirty, forty people say these things," claimed the Vivaut ally and witness for Amiel, Primar Mirapeis. In the testimony, then, events were strung together into a sequence, with one act of vengeance following upon another. That is a key point, for this act of making a history took the isolated events of the past, knowledge of which circulated widely in the city, and built them into an ordered chronology. the actions of the defendants: in a heroic culture, revenge is inevitable and mechanical. It is an emotion or action that suppresses the will. The appeal to the logic of vengeance was not blatant in the appeals:
vengeance was in sufficiently bad odor, among both ecclesiastics and secular judges in the mid-fourteenth century, to allow a more obvious appeal to the validity of vendetta. In the inquisition trial, after all, the defendants initially tried to develop a more conventional argument based on self-defense. But the appellate strategy is evident enough, to judge by the weight of testimony allotted to the questions and by the repetitious quality of the testimony. Thanks to the public arena in which appeals were heard, moreover, the stories could be publicized in their new historical clothing, accompanied by all the ritualistic elements of the judicial process, outside the social spheres in which they originally circulated. In that way, the court system, however much it may have hindered the untrammeled pursuit of blood, unwittingly contributed to an institutionalization, in the form of public histories, of the very hatreds it sought to suppress.
Justice as Vengeance
Hatreds were also institutionalized in the drama of the court itself.
Spilling blood was pleasurable enough, but where it was constrained, avatars of violence could always seek vengeance in court. The appeal, allowing as it did the telling of stories, permitted one party to execute a kind of rhetorical vengeance. Such vengeance was a delicate affair. Blood vengeance was portrayed as noble and heroic. Yet anyone could recognize that the tactic tended to place the parties on an equally honorable footing. The Vivaut, for instance, could avoid only with difficulty a serious problem in their arguments, namely that the very Jerusalem iniquities that were so upsetting to them were clearly, in many cases, ripostes to Vivaut assaults. To take but one example, the attempted assassination of the Vivaut allyJohan Casse was a very reasonable response, according to the logic of vengeance, to an earlier event, for Johan apparently had murdered Marques de Jerusalem. So witnesses characterized the violence of their enemies in such a way as to make it offensive to common social norms, and therefore, in some respects, uncivilized.71 Vivaut witnesses, for example, liked to tell stories of how the Jerusalem scaled the walls of buildings to break in and murder their victhe actions of the defendants: in a heroic culture, revenge is inevitable and mechanical. It is an emotion or action that suppresses the will. The appeal to the logic of vengeance was not blatant in the appeals: vengeance was in sufficiently bad odor, among both ecclesiastics and secular judges in the mid-fourteenth century, to allow a more obvious appeal to the validity of vendetta. In the inquisition trial, after all, the defendants initially tried to develop a more conventional argument based on self-defense. But the appellate strategy is evident enough, to judge by the weight of testimony allotted to the questions and by the repetitious quality of the testimony. Thanks to the public arena in which appeals were heard, moreover, the stories could be publicized in their new historical clothing, accompanied by all the ritualistic elements of the judicial process, outside the social spheres in which they originally circulated. In that way, the court system, however much it may have hindered the untrammeled pursuit of blood, unwittingly contributed to an institutionalization, in the form of public histories, of the very hatreds it sought to suppress.
Spilling blood was pleasurable enough, but where it was constrained, avatars of violence could always seek vengeance in court. The appeal, allowing as it did the telling of stories, permitted one party to execute a kind of rhetorical vengeance.
Such vengeance was a delicate affair. Blood vengeance was portrayed as noble and heroic. Yet anyone could recognize that the tactic tended to place the parties on an equally honorable footing. The Vivaut, for instance, could avoid only with difficulty a serious problem in their arguments, namely that the very Jerusalem iniquities that were so upsetting to them were clearly, in many cases, ripostes to Vivaut assaults. To take but one example, the attempted assassination of the Vivaut allyJohan Casse was a very reasonable response, according to the logic of vengeance, to an earlier event, for Johan apparently had murdered Marques de Jerusalem. So witnesses characterized the violence of their enemies in such a way as to make it offensive to common social norms, and therefore, in some respects, uncivilized.71 Vivaut witnesses, for example, liked to tell stories of how the Jerusalem scaled the walls of buildings to break in and murder their vic-tims, chanting, "Mora! Mora!" as they did so.72 They were described as "rabid" That argument shows up elsewhere in court cases from the period. It is a curious claim. Does one ever prosecute out of affection? Nonetheless, it reveals well the sense that the courts were being used for something other than what defendants imagined they should be used for, to develop hatreds rather than resolve them.85 The implication seems clear: it is dishonorable to get the court to do your dirty work. If vengeance is to be taken, it should be pursued outside the court: a maxim, of course, honored chiefly in the breach.
A Language of Membership
Hatreds, as we have seen, were as much institutionalized as they were repressed by court intervention in mid-fourteenth-century Marseille. First, the appellate process helped people create and make formal their histories and therefore identities, serving, if not to create, at least to affirm group identity, helping to solidify the sense of a common grievance. Second, the court itself was a place for the pursuit of vengeance, not its repression. The experience of prosecution helped crystallize factional identity in a third way, namely by providing a language of group membership and by encouraging witnesses and defendants to identify themselves, publicly, with one party or another.
The judges in these cases liked to think in simple, clear terms. That argument shows up elsewhere in court cases from the period. It is a curious claim. Does one ever prosecute out of affection? Nonetheless, it reveals well the sense that the courts were being used for something other than what defendants imagined they should be used for, to develop hatreds rather than resolve them.85 The implication seems clear: it is dishonorable to get the court to do your dirty work. If vengeance is to be taken, it should be pursued outside the court: a maxim, of course, honored chiefly in the breach.
The judges in these cases liked to think in simple, clear terms. The The very act of prosecution encouraged a group identity. To prosecute the Vivaut party as a group in 1351 was to assume that it was a party and not an assemblage of individuals fighting for their in-laws and masters. This very same group, in defending itself, in allowing itself to be represented by one of its members during the appeal, was forced to develop a common purpose and share a common lot. When Amiel Bonafos and Girart de Buco lodged their appeals in 1356, they searched for witnesses; that search caused them naturally to turn to their old friends, many of whom had kept track of their actions and could say something in their defense. The testimony of two-thirds of the witnesses in Amiel's appeal was subsequently impugned by the clavaire during the rebuttal; he claimed that the testimony should be discounted because they were "partial toward and members of the party of Amiel and the Vivaut" [cum sint et fuerint parciales et de parte dicti Amelii et Vivaudorum]. In this argument there is no possibility that the party was disassembling itself. The antagonisms caused by this point of view may well have encouraged the continuation of party identity and stoked the hatred that fueled that identity.
By using a rigid language of party membership, then, the very act of prosecution played some role in shaping party identity. Even the publicity of court proceedings arguably had a hand in committing people to parties. Reprisals against witnesses, as we have seen, could be severe; the difficulty in finding supposedly impartial witnesses willing to testify may help explain why Amiel Bonafos and Girart de Buco were forced to rely on so many old friends during their appeals. But one must also appreciate the influence of being named as a party member or even a sympathizer during a trial, an act that surely made a future neutrality, especially for the weak, very difficult to achieve.
That fact helps explain one of the most interesting features of the "period of battles": its close proximity to the Black Death of 1348. To judge by the histories outlined above, the bellicose era followed immediately on the heels of the Black Death. The two extant peace ac- The very act of prosecution encouraged a group identity. To prosecute the Vivaut party as a group in 1351 was to assume that it was a party and not an assemblage of individuals fighting for their in-laws and masters. This very same group, in defending itself, in allowing itself to be represented by one of its members during the appeal, was forced to develop a common purpose and share a common lot. When Amiel Bonafos and Girart de Buco lodged their appeals in 1356, they searched for witnesses; that search caused them naturally to turn to their old friends, many of whom had kept track of their actions and could say something in their defense. The testimony of two-thirds of the witnesses in Amiel's appeal was subsequently impugned by the clavaire during the rebuttal; he claimed that the testimony should be discounted because they were "partial toward and members of the party of Amiel and the Vivaut" [cum sint et fuerint parciales et de parte dicti Amelii et Vivaudorum]. In this argument there is no possibility that the party was disassembling itself. The antagonisms caused by this point of view may well have encouraged the continuation of party identity and stoked the hatred that fueled that identity.
That fact helps explain one of the most interesting features of the "period of battles": its close proximity to the Black Death of 1348. To judge by the histories outlined above, the bellicose era followed immediately on the heels of the Black Death. The two extant peace ac-cords (transcribed in Amiel Bonafos's appeal in 1356) date from March 1350 and July 1351.105 The three major appeals and the ten lesser appeals arising from the hatred and found in the extant court records all fall between 1351 and 1356-that despite the fact that the appellate records survive in roughly equal numbers on both sides of the plague. The reasons for that, surely, are complicated. Some can be assigned to the changing ecology of postplague Marseille. In the first decade or so after 1348, resources were both scarce and superabundant, as property values dropped and large amounts of unwanted property were dumped on the market. Labor costs soared. Rent revenue declined. Landlords had difficulty finding tenants or workers for the lands they owned or controlled. Although the sources are too thin to allow us to study how particular families responded to the new ecology, one can easily imagine how the intestine quarrels of Marseille's patriciate may have become inflamed in a struggle to control labor and revenue from rents. Migrants, moreover, moved in great numbers into the city; their connections to the city's social and patronal networks presumably were thin.'06 The postplague battles themselves can be understood, in part, as recruiting grounds for these and other unconnected people, venues where hard-line party leaders could display party strength and test loyalties.
The courts played a role in the process of recruitment, for the act of prosecution caused identities to become public. That is true in the most banal of ways. Vivaut defendants testifying during the inquisition into the battle of 1351 provided the judge with long lists of Vivaut allies, naming names and describing arms. They were strikingly unable, however, to name the enemy, apart from the well-known figures of Peire de Jerusalem and his captain, Isnart Eguesier, along with the latter's squire. "He could not recognize them," the notary writes duringJohan Aycart's testimony, "because they were armed." 107 The armor was stripped off in court, the faces exposed, the anonymity shattered. The names were inscribed on parchment and publicized in the openair court. Given the dangers one risked as a party member, it was an act that could only cement alliances and rigidify party lines. The courts played a role in the process of recruitment, for the act of prosecution caused identities to become public. That is true in the most banal of ways. Vivaut defendants testifying during the inquisition into the battle of 1351 provided the judge with long lists of Vivaut allies, naming names and describing arms. They were strikingly unable, however, to name the enemy, apart from the well-known figures of Peire de Jerusalem and his captain, Isnart Eguesier, along with the latter's squire. "He could not recognize them," the notary writes duringJohan Aycart's testimony, "because they were armed." 107 The armor was stripped off in court, the faces exposed, the anonymity shattered. The names were inscribed on parchment and publicized in the openair court. Given the dangers one risked as a party member, it was an act that could only cement alliances and rigidify party lines. that had been so prominent a feature of medieval law and society began to recede. It is easy to assume that the one followed logically from the other. Yet we now know that the process was considerably more complex. Emerging systems of arbitration and peacemaking competed with centralized courts of law for jurisdiction over violence. Many have pointed out that the punishments inflicted in the name of law and order are no less violent than those pursued in the name of vengeance, that law and vengeance are less distinct than we once thought. Litigation has been recognized as a form of revenge.108 In studying the comparatively new judicial system of Angevin Marseille, this article has added yet another qualifying perspective: courts of judicial inquisition, at an early stage of their evolution, did not necessarily repress violence as quietly and as easily as we used to think. Judicial intervention, of course, did not create the factional hatreds that wracked Angevin Marseille in the decades around the Black Death of 1348. Instead, the courts contributed to a hardening of existing but ill-defined boundaries. They did so by unwittingly encouraging the telling of histories that served to anchor people in the past and provide them with an identity in the present. They did so by acting as venues for the pursuit of vengeance and by undermining the possibilities of peace. They did so by creating or encouraging a language of party membership. In all those ways, the courts promoted, rather than repressed, dissension and strife. The best we can say is that the courts eventually made vengeance less bloody and more stylized; after the 1350s, the great Vivaut/Jerusalem hatred becomes less visible, at least in the court records. The courts offered the wrathful a chance to satisfy their cravings for vengeance without risking life and limb. In that civilizing process, though, the courts were not the primary agents of change. In search of a deeper understanding, we should look to the understanding shared by all that blood vengeance can be costly and undesirable.109 Traces of this discomfiture crop up in the sourceswhen the old men, for example, try to persuade their sons to leave off the battles and make peace, or when kinfolk and friends urge the bellicose to uphold a peace. The courts, then, can be seen as witnesses to a larger transformation in late medieval habits of hatred and peacemaking. It was a transformation the courts and their agents may have influenced profoundly, but one that they did not direct. that had been so prominent a feature of medieval law and society began to recede. It is easy to assume that the one followed logically from the other. Yet we now know that the process was considerably more complex. Emerging systems of arbitration and peacemaking competed with centralized courts of law for jurisdiction over violence. Many have pointed out that the punishments inflicted in the name of law and order are no less violent than those pursued in the name of vengeance, that law and vengeance are less distinct than we once thought. Litigation has been recognized as a form of revenge.108 In studying the comparatively new judicial system of Angevin Marseille, this article has added yet another qualifying perspective: courts of judicial inquisition, at an early stage of their evolution, did not necessarily repress violence as quietly and as easily as we used to think. Judicial intervention, of course, did not create the factional hatreds that wracked Angevin Marseille in the decades around the Black Death of 1348. Instead, the courts contributed to a hardening of existing but ill-defined boundaries. They did so by unwittingly encouraging the telling of histories that served to anchor people in the past and provide them with an identity in the present. They did so by acting as venues for the pursuit of vengeance and by undermining the possibilities of peace. They did so by creating or encouraging a language of party membership. In all those ways, the courts promoted, rather than repressed, dissension and strife. The best we can say is that the courts eventually made vengeance less bloody and more stylized; after the 1350s, the great Vivaut/Jerusalem hatred becomes less visible, at least in the court records. The courts offered the wrathful a chance to satisfy their cravings for vengeance without risking life and limb. In that civilizing process, though, the courts were not the primary agents of change. In search of a deeper understanding, we should look to the understanding shared by all that blood vengeance can be costly and undesirable.109 Traces of this discomfiture crop up in the sourceswhen the old men, for example, try to persuade their sons to leave off the battles and make peace, or when kinfolk and friends urge the bellicose to uphold a peace. The courts, then, can be seen as witnesses to a larger transformation in late medieval habits of hatred and peacemaking. It was a transformation the courts and their agents may have influenced profoundly, but one that they did not direct. 
Conclusion

